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Abstract
This paper analyses the effects on patent quality of a type of spillovers arising from the 
disclosure of patent information by firms engaged in competition in a global duopoly. Both 
firms are involved in producing new technologies and they do not cooperate on joint pat-
ents. In this context, we explored whether the disclosure of crucial knowledge in the pat-
ents of one of the firms affects the patent quality of its respective competitor. The empirical 
methodology relies on forward citations as an indicator of quality, and backward citations 
to the competitor as a measure of spillovers. We estimated several count models with a 
sample of 7750 patent families (divided into subsamples) owned by two large companies, 
Airbus and Boeing. Our econometric findings show that, for technologies in which the two 
firms account for the majority of the global patents, neither of the firms in the duopoly was 
able to harness spillovers from the rival to improve the quality of its patents. However, 
knowledge from the competitor becomes relevant, at least for one of the focal firms, in 
explaining patent quality of other technologies in which the two firms do not exert a domi-
nant position.
Keywords Technological value · Patent disclosure · Spillovers · Global duopoly · Patent 
citations · Patent family
JEL Classification O31 · O33 · D23
1 Introduction
Empirical literature has shown a strong relationship between patent quality (e.g., the 
impact of a patent on subsequent patented inventions) and some indicators of firm perfor-
mance (Chen & Chang, 2010; Hall & MacGarvie, 2010; Hall et al., 2005; Harrigan et al., 
2018; Hirschey & Richardson, 2004; Patel & Ward, 2011). For example, Hirchey and Rich-
arson (2004) found that various measures of patent quality have positive and statistically 
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significant effects on stock prices. According to Hall et al. (2005), if the quality of patents 
owned by a firm increases, so that on average these patents receive one additional cita-
tion, the firm’s market value would increase by around 3%. Patent quality is also related to 
reputation for technological innovation, which in turn correlates with the firm’s competi-
tive advantage (Henard & Dacin, 2010; Höflinger et al., 2018). Furthermore, along with 
the close link between patent quality and firm value, patent quality promotes innovation 
by reducing transaction costs and coordinating R&D efforts between rivals (Sag & Rohde, 
2007; Thomas, 2002).
These far-reaching consequences of patent quality for the firm have triggered politi-
cal and academic interest in understanding the factors affecting patent quality. Among 
other causes, research has found that information disclosed in patents offers opportunities 
through spillovers to improve the quality of subsequent patented technologies. Although 
there is a wide variety of well-known channels and sources of spillovers, those produced 
through patent disclosure from competitors are worth studying for two reasons. First, a 
high percentage of firms’ researchers read and scrutinize patents for scientific reasons 
(Ouellette, 2017; Sampat, 2018).1 Second, firms may use the knowledge embedded in 
competitors’ patents to obtain non-infringing patented inventions of better quality. In other 
words, the use of technological knowledge from a competitor may allow a given firm to 
achieve results with less research effort than otherwise, undermining the market position of 
the rival firm that generated the knowledge (Frishammar et al., 2015; Ritala et al., 2018).
While some empirical papers did not break up the sources of the flows of technological 
knowledge that give rise to spillovers (e.g., Gambardella et al., 2008; Giuliani et al., 2016; 
Harhoff et al., 2003b; Lee et al., 2007; Tahmooresnejad & Beaudry, 2019), other studies 
have gone a step further by analysing the origin of spillovers to identify their effect on pat-
ent quality across geographical areas (Lee et al., 2012), institutions (Sapsalis et al., 2006), 
and technological fields (Nemet & Johnson, 2012; Moaniba et  al., 2018; Barbieri et  al., 
2020). However, despite competing firms being important sources of spillovers (Sofka & 
Grimpe, 2010; Czarnitzki & Kraft, 2012), to our knowledge, no previous work has empiri-
cally addressed the role of spillovers from patent disclosure on the subsequent quality of 
patents owned by firms engaged in duopolistic competition on a global scale. This paper 
aims to fill this gap by analysing the effect on patent quality of technological knowledge 
spillovers that occur in markets where there are two main competing firms and where each 
firm scrutinizes and builds on ideas from the patent information of its respective rival. This 
could be the case, for example, of Airbus and Boeing in the aircraft industry, Google LLC-
Android and Apple in the field of mobile operating systems, and Visa and Mastercard in 
the financial sector.
Our empirical analysis uses data from two competing firms in the aircraft industry, Air-
bus and Boeing. Aircraft technology is part of the aerospace sector, which is classified as 
a multi-technology industry that generates spillovers leading to the development of other 
advanced technologies with impacts on the whole economy (Kim et al., 2016; Park et al., 
1 Sampat (2018) provides indirect evidence that patents disclose useful technological information and sug-
gests that several studies collectively indicate that patents do contain useful information, ‘contrary to some 
commentary’. Recent research by Ouellette (2017) contains precise data for the US. This study included 
a diverse group of US researchers that yielded 832 respondents. The results indicate that 79% of industry 
researchers and 80% of researchers in other sectors had read patents for some scientific reasons, including 
searches for both general information and specific solutions; 60% of all patent readers and 72% of those 
reading for scientific reasons reported that they found useful information in the most recent patent read in 
their field.
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2012). Within the aerospace sector, the market for large aircraft is a duopoly (Ibsen, 2009; 
Bénassy‐Quéré et al., 2011; Schmitt & Gollnick, 2016, p. 158) that matches the purpose of 
our analysis.
To link the patent quality of one firm with the knowledge disclosed in the competitor’s 
patents, we estimate some models in which the dependent variable is a measure of quality 
(forward patent citations), and the main independent variable is the inflow of knowledge 
stemming from the main competitor (captured by the number of backward patent cita-
tions to the competitor). Along with the role of spillovers from the competing firm, our 
models considered other explanatory factors discussed in studies on patent quality, such 
as the flows of knowledge from other agents, the characteristics of the technology and the 
teams involved in producing the patent (e.g. Chang et al., 2018; Gay et al., 2005; Lahiri, 
2010; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004; Nemet & Johnson, 2012; Popp, 2006; Sapsalis 
et al., 2006). Our sample consisted of 7750 patent families owned by Airbus and Boeing, 
which were divided into two subsamples according to the share of the number of patents 
that the two firms own. One subsample concerns technological classes where Airbus and 
Boeing account for the majority of the global patents (dominant position in the produc-
tion of patents). The other subsample contains patents in which the participation of Airbus 
and Boeing is low, with many other firms contributing to patent production (non-dominant 
position).
Since the effects of spillovers on patent quality may affect both the recipient and the 
source of the relevant knowledge, clarifying these effects has important managerial impli-
cations; in particular, for those involved in knowledge organization of large firms that com-
pete in the generation of patents. For the recipient, this analysis has relevance because of 
the close relationship between patent quality and firm value; according to the literature, the 
firm’s value increases if patent quality increases, resulting in a better position in the market 
(Hall et al., 2005; Harrigan et al., 2018). For the source, the leakage of knowledge to a rival 
undermines the original innovator’s profit, and weakens its competitive capacity (Easterby-
Smith et al., 2008; Frishammar et al., 2015; Green & Scotchmer, 1995). The findings of 
this paper are also informative for the patent system, in particular in exploring the extent to 
which it accomplishes the objective of facilitating follow-on inventions in global duopolies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 includes two subsections; 
the first defines patent quality and explains how it is measured, and the second develops 
the main hypotheses. Section 3 deals with the variables and the model. Section 4 presents 
the data and a brief descriptive analysis of the Airbus–Boeing technological relationship. 
The core empirical estimation and robustness are presented in Sect. 5. Section 6 contains 
a brief discussion and policy implications of our findings, and Sect. 7 concludes and pro-
vides some suggestions for future research.
2  Literature review
2.1  Patent quality, meaning and measure
Patent quality is usually defined according to two major criteria (Burke & Reitzig, 2007; 
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2007, p. 115; Wagner, 2009; Scellato et  al., 2011). The 
first criterion deals with the legal certainty or reliability of a patent as an enforceable prop-
erty right. For example, a patent is of good quality if the likelihood of it being upheld by 
the courts is high (Harhoff, 2016). The second criterion concerns the technological and 
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economic aspects of patents, for example the underlying capacity of knowledge embedded 
in the patent to promote innovation, encourage the diffusion of technology, and affect eco-
nomic performance. In this paper, the term ‘patent quality’ follows the latter economic and 
technological approach.2 The quality of a patent is defined in this paper as its impact on 
subsequent patented inventions. In this respect, we follow the definition of Argyres and Sil-
verman (2004), Gay et al. (2005), Popp (2006), Sapsalis et al. (2006), Lahiri (2010), Nemet 
and Johnson (2012), and Schmid and Fajebe (2019). Thus, a patent that has an impact on 
many subsequent patents, in the sense that it is used to support other inventions, is con-
sidered to have higher quality than another with limited impact. A related concept used in 
the literature is ‘patent value’, a term linked to the extent to which the impact of the pat-
ent correlates with any indicator of firm performance and market value (for discussions 
see Barberá-Tomás et al., 2011; de Rassenfosse & Jaffe, 2018). There are clear differences 
between these concepts; however, there is strong evidence in the literature that indicators 
of technological quality of patents are correlated with their economic value (see references 
in surveys by Hall & Harhoff, 2012; de Rassenfosse & Jaffe, 2018).
Depending on the objective of the analysis, research has followed different strategies 
to measure patent quality. Those concerned with patent scope have used the number of 
claims or the number of patent families as an indicator (Harhoff et al., 2003a, 2003b; Sap-
salis et  al., 2006). Patent renewal is another well-known indicator when the objective is 
to estimate the value of patent protection (Bessen, 2008; Grönqvist, 2009; Lanjouw et al., 
1998; Lee & Sohn, 2017; Schankerman & Pakes, 1986; Schubert, 2011). Sometimes, com-
plex combinations of indicators were used to measure patent quality (e.g. de Rassenfosse & 
Jaffe, 2018; Jiang et al., 2019). This study is based on another well-known approach, aim-
ing to measure patent quality by the number of forward patent citations (as in, for example, 
Lerner, 1994; Hall et  al., 2005; Lee et  al., 2007; Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe, 2007; 
Acosta et al., 2009; Sterzi, 2013; Giuliani et al., 2016).
The logic behind using forward citations to capture the importance of patents is based 
on the idea that patents that have been cited by subsequent patents in their ‘state of the art’ 
section (or forward citations), include bits of knowledge on which the underlying inven-
tions rely. Therefore, if a patent is cited in many subsequent patents, this means that this 
particular patent has had a greater technological impact on future inventions, or it is more 
important that other patents that are less cited. Forward citations may also capture the eco-
nomic value, as several validation studies have proved. Validation studies have found cor-
relations between forward citations and different measures of patent value, such as social 
value (e.g., Trajtenberg, 1990), values that R&D managers and experts give to patents 
(e.g., Albert et al., 1991; Harhoff et al., 1999), variation in the stock market value of firms 
(Hall et  al., 2005), the decision to pay renewal fees (Bessen, 2008; Harhoff & Wagner, 
2009; Thomas, 1999), measures of performance (Moser et  al., 2017), and licensing rev-
enue (Abrams et al., 2018). Some studies, however, cast doubt on forward citations as an 
indicator of economic value because the authors did not find such a clear relationship (e.g., 
Gambardella et al., 2008; Azagra-Caro et al., 2017). Overall, the use of citations may be 
2 Legal quality corresponds to a different strand of literature concerned with the legal validity as a metric 
of quality (e.g. whether claims have been accurately distinguished from the prior art. See for example Mann 
and Underweiser, 2012, for a discussion of legal quality). However, although our analysis does not focus 
on legal quality, there could be a correlation between legal and economic quality. For example, the use of 
unclear language in writing the patent can lead both to less legal validity and less technological impact in 
subsequent patented inventions because of the difficulty in understanding confusing technical terminology.
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justified as a measure of technological impact/value, but with some assumed shortcom-
ings. For example, some authors have warned that predictions may carry significant ‘noise’ 
(Gambardella et  al., 2008; Hall et  al., 2005). This noise can arise from several sources 
related to the role of examiners, self-citations and time truncation. For example, Azagra-
Caro and Tur (2018) show that citation patterns vary depending on the nationality of the 
patent examiner. An analysis of US patents by Moser et  al. (2017) indicates that exam-
iner-added citations are typically unrelated to improvements in performance or a follow-on 
invention. This study suggests, as we do in this paper, that citations by examiners should 
be excluded from the number of forward citations. By contrast, self-citations have an even 
more pronounced effect on market value than other citations (Jaffe & Trajtenberg, 2002, p. 
16; Hall et al., 2005).
Finally, the truncation problem must be addressed. Citation counts are inherently trun-
cated, as patents continue to be cited over long periods and more recent patents have a 
lower probability of being cited. A solution proposed in the literature to avoid truncation, 
and which we also apply in our empirical analysis, is to consider patents with a window 
of at least five years from their application date (Lahiri, 2010; Lanjouw & Schankerman, 
2004; Mariani & Romanelli, 2007).
2.2  The role of competitors’ spillovers on patent quality in a global duopoly: theory 
and hypotheses
Our analysis focuses on two large companies that manufacture similar technological 
products and patent in numerous fields. In some specific fields they exert a clear domi-
nance since they own the largest segment of the worldwide production of patents, form-
ing a global duopoly. In this context, to spur on patent quality, firms count on two broad 
sources of knowledge: internal, which originates within a firm (from the results of their 
own past research), and is incorporated in its patents, and external, which stems from dif-
ferent sources outside the firm (Lee et al., 2012; Leiponen & Helfat, 2010). To identify the 
role of the competitor’s knowledge as a source of ideas, the external flow of knowledge can 
be split into two sources, namely, the main competitor and other sources of technological 
knowledge.
The knowledge flow from the main competitor occurs when the recipient firm uses 
ideas from knowledge embedded in the rival firm’s patents. As long as there is no joint 
venture between the firms to produce collaborative patented inventions, knowledge circu-
lates without compensation. When this happens, it seems reasonable to identify this type 
of knowledge flow between competitors as knowledge spillovers (Baldwin & Hanel, 2003; 
McGahan & Silverman, 2006). The second external source of ideas comprises flows of 
knowledge arising from universities and public institutions, government, laboratories, 
firms in the same sector (other than competitors), and firms from other sectors.
The disclosure of the patents applied for by each company creates a stock of knowl-
edge which is available to others, but not all of this knowledge is equally accessible 
to a rival firm. Literature identifies several factors –legal, geographical and technologi-
cal– that prevent companies from an efficient use of spillovers arising from disclosed 
patents. First, the mechanisms for a competitor to build on relevant technological spillo-
vers from patents can be hampered by legal hurdles. By ‘legal hurdles’ we mean the 
ability of the firm (or its attorney), to describe the patented invention in such a way 
that, without infringing, it creates obstacles to the proper understanding of the details 
of the invention by a potential competitor. Despite patent laws making it compulsory to 
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disclose details of the patented technology in clear, concise and exact terms, a firm can 
hinder the access of a rival to its own knowledge in several ways (Seymore, 2009; Hall 
& Harhoff, 2012; Heger et  al., 2019; Baruffaldi & Simeth, 2020). These may include 
removing some key technical details without infringing the disclosure principle (and 
hence the patent may not contain information of relevant value to build on); by mak-
ing the language of the patent somehow unintelligible for a reader; or by formulating 
ambiguous claims in an effort to expand the patent rights as far as possible. As a conse-
quence, inventors may be discouraged from capturing patent knowledge from a competi-
tor because the blurred language makes it difficult to understand the details. Thus, they 
may prefer that patent applications are not at stake, avoiding the risk of patent infringe-
ment. Experience shows that information disclosed in patents is difficult to understand 
in some sectors (Chang et al., 2019; Sáiz & Amengual, 2018).
Second, there are technological and geographical barriers that make it difficult for a 
competitor to absorb the disclosed patented knowledge. The capacity to capture spillovers 
may be mediated by the proximity between the technological domains of the source and 
the recipient firms (e.g. Bloom et al., 2013; Marrocu et al., 2013; Quatraro & Usai, 2017); 
the larger the technological distance, the less is the opportunity for the competitor to take 
advantage of spillovers. The geographical proximity to the knowledge source is another 
factor that has been proved to be a key determinant facilitating spillovers (e.g. Aldieri & 
Vinci, 2016; Audretsch & Feldman, 1996; Cappelli & Montobbio, 2020; Jaffe et al., 1993; 
Marrocu et al., 2013; Quatraro & Usai, 2017). However, this factor is not relevant for pro-
ducing spillovers in the case of large firms that operate in globalized markets (Bloom et al., 
2013). Finally, firms need to understand the technological details of the rival firm’s pat-
ents. In other words, some absorptive capacity is necessary, which means that the extent to 
which the firm benefits from spillovers depends on its own investment in R&D (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1989, 1990).
Not all of the previous factors have the same importance in our setting (two large firms 
competing in the same technological field). As the two firms work on similar products, the 
technological distance is close and is not an obstacle to capturing the competitor’s spillo-
vers. Geographical distance cannot prevent the use of a rival’s knowledge since both firms 
are global; patents can be read and scrutinized in any place, irrespective of the location of 
the patent’s owner. Both firms possess enough absorptive capacity to understand potential 
knowledge in their field since the two firms are global companies in the industry. They 
are supposed to invest heavily in R&D to produce their own patents (as the pioneering 
works of Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990, suggest, the absorptive capacity is correlated 
with R&D investments). These similarities imply that, in a global duopoly, the main instru-
ment used by a source firm to prevent leakage of relevant knowledge that might produce 
spillovers to a competitor will be the use of legal barriers. Then, either of the two firms 
(or both) could choose to disclose information that could be confusing enough (without 
infringing the patent) to make such information valueless for improving the patent quality 
of a competitor.
As an alternative to using blurred language in describing the technical details of the 
patent, the firm has the option of keeping important inventions secret and patenting only 
less important inventions. Thus, the firm would apply for patents only for small inven-
tions for which there is no risk of leaking useful knowledge (or for which any knowledge 
leakages would be worthless for the competitor). Theoretical models point in this direc-
tion. For example, Anton and Yao (2004) focus on a firm’s decision about how much of 
an innovation should be disclosed and how much should be kept secret, which is a major 
business concern as disclosure would provide competitors with usable information. They 
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find that property rights mean that disclosure incentives are relatively stronger for smaller 
innovations. As a result, larger and more important innovations are protected more through 
secrecy as a response to the problem of imitation.
In the context of a global duopoly, in which there are clear differences in the mechanism 
for facilitating (or hampering) spillovers from patent disclosure between large competi-
tors and other settings, we put forward our hypotheses. We assume a setting of two large 
dominant firms competing in an industry in which they do not produce joint patents. The 
flow of knowledge takes place between the two firms when researchers from one firm read 
and scrutinize a disclosed patent document from the rival, capturing valuable knowledge 
and ideas upon which they base their innovations. In other words, patents may provide 
valuable information on which the rival can build to produce other patents of higher qual-
ity. Two different scenarios of technological competition are considered. In the first case 
there is a dominant position in the production of some particular technologies within the 
duopoly; the two companies account for the largest number of patents globally produced in 
several specific technological classes. In the second case, there is no such dominance; the 
two firms generate a relatively small number of patents, and share the production of patents 
with many other firms. Our hypotheses explore the link between the acquisition of external 
knowledge captured from information disclosed by a rival company in its patents (spillo-
vers from the main competitor) and the patent quality of the recipient in these two different 
scenarios.
Our prediction is that, in the first scenario, leaking knowledge through patent disclosure 
will not affect the quality of the competitor’s patent. The source firm will purposely choose 
to disclose worthless information by using confusing language or patenting small inven-
tions to prevent the competitor from building on such information. The leaked knowledge 
should be valueless for the competitor because if both source and recipient work in areas 
that are at a close technological distance, outgoing spillovers will have a negative effect for 
the source (the reason is that these spillovers can benefit the recipient through imitation 
without infringing). The source firm may be reluctant to disclose crucial details in patents 
because it cannot profit from the cost reductions provided to the main competitor. If such 
externalities exist, the source may be hurt since the competitor becomes stronger (Fris-
hammar et al., 2015; Ritala et al., 2018; Scotchmer & Green, 1990). The recipient, on the 
other hand, works at close technological distance to the source, which means that the risk 
of infringing by capturing the competitor’s knowledge is high. Consequently, the recipient 
can include knowledge from a rival as background in its patents, but only as a legal require-
ment, and not because they can or want to build on it. Both the source and the recipient 
thus have sufficient incentives to avoid flows of knowledge between them that might be 
useful for improving patent quality. These arguments lead to our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 In a global duopoly where the focal firms have a dominant position in tech-
nology production, knowledge spillovers stemming from disclosure of information in pat-
ents owned by one firm do not affect the quality of the other firm’s patents.
By contrast, in a second scenario with both firms working in different technological 
areas and with other companies producing patents in these fields, the decision to avoid 
disclosure of technological details may not be taken, as long as both companies can reap 
future benefits by releasing relevant knowledge. The reason for this is that patenting not 
only involves decisions about the amount of enabling knowledge to be transmitted to one’s 
competitor; it is also a useful signal to others of the total knowledge that the innovator 
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possesses, which helps to reduce the possibility of being held up by external patent owners 
(Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Anton and Yao, 2004). This suggests that when both large compet-
ing firms work in the same industry, but in different technological fields, with neither firm 
dominating and with the presence of additional participants in the fields, both firms will 
be willing to include relevant technological details in their patents. This voluntary leak of 
knowledge could favour the patent quality of the main competitor, but the benefits could 
outweigh this drawback. Such benefits include opening opportunities for potential collab-
orations and licensing, future reabsorption of recombined knowledge, and an increase in 
reputation as a leading firm (Bessen & Maskin, 2009; Yang et al., 2010; Belenzon, 2011). 
It is assumed that these advantages can make up for the drawback of knowledge leakages to 
the main rival. On this basis, we put forward our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2 In a global duopoly where the focal firms do not have a dominant position in 
technology production, spillovers arising from disclosing information in patents owned by 
one of the two firms positively affect the patent quality of the other.
The confirmation of our two hypotheses by empirical evidence would suggest that firms 
could strategically manage their knowledge, releasing or retaining knowledge according to 
a market strategy. In other words, the spillovers could be intentional.
3  Variables and model
3.1  Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is patent quality, measured by the number of forward citations 
that a patent receives. The interpretation given to forward citations is basically in terms 
of technological impact; however, a high number of forward citations also reflects a high 
economic value. Both technological impact and economic value fit within the objective of 
determining whether the knowledge from the competitor contributes to strengthening the 
recipient technologically, which is the key issue tested in this paper.
Considering the previous remarks, the dependent variable in this work is the number of 
times that a focal patent family was cited as relevant state of the art in subsequent patent 
families filed within a 5-year time window after the first application for the focal patent 
family, including self-citations and excluding examiner citations (fpc5years). A patent fam-
ily comprises all patent documents covering the same invention. More precisely, it can be 
defined as the set of patents filed in several countries that are related to each other by one 
or several common priority filings (Zuniga et al., 2009, p. 71; for a detailed discussion, see 
Martínez, 2010, 2011). One of the main advantages of using patent families is the avoid-
ance of duplication of the information contained in patents that cover the same invention in 
different countries (de Rassenfosse et al., 2014; Martínez, 2011). Moreover, the calculated 
citation indicators may differ substantially depending on the procedures of the patent office 
where the patent application was submitted. Therefore, patent families reveal the most uni-
form results, and can be used as a comprehensive measure of inventiveness compared to 
the simple count of patents (Bakker et al., 2016; Tahmooresnejad & Beaudry, 2019; van 
Raan, 2017). As patent families contain different dates, and we considered a window of 
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five years, it is important to clarify the dates. Following de Rassenfosse et al. (2014), the 
date of reference is set to the earliest date of publication.
3.2  Independent variables
3.2.1  Variables capturing flows of knowledge
In order to isolate the technological knowledge spillovers stemming from the main com-
petitor’s patents, we divided the total technological knowledge flow into three sources: (i) 
technological knowledge flows from the main competitor, (ii) from other sources of tech-
nological knowledge, and (iii) internal knowledge flows. The knowledge flow between 
main competitors (spillovers) takes place when one of the two main firms captures relevant 
knowledge from the rival’s patents. Technological knowledge flows from other sources 
include knowledge from firms in the same sector (other than the main competitor), from 
other sectors, and knowledge from institutions (including universities). Finally, the internal 
knowledge flows are based on each firm’s past research. To link the knowledge from the 
main competitor to patent quality, it was assumed that backward patent citations capture 
the knowledge flows, as several validation studies have proved (Corsino et al., 2019; Jaffe 
et al., 2000; MacGarvie, 2005).3 Backward citations are basically an indicator of the extent 
of reliance on previous technology (Jaffe & de Rassenfosse, 2017). The OECD Patent Sta-
tistic Manual (Zuniga et al., 2009, p. 109) defines backward patent citations as follows ‘If 
a patent B cites patent A, it means that patent A represents a piece of previously existing 
knowledge upon which patent B builds or to which patent B relates, and over which B can-
not have a claim.’ Put simply, the logic behind backward citations for capturing knowledge 
flows relies on the idea that a patent refers to a piece of knowledge that has been useful in 
developing a patented invention. The interpretation of backward citations as an indicator 
of spillovers involves some difficulties. For example, applicants might include citations for 
different reasons, and many of the citations in patents are added by the examiner rather than 
the applicant. In these cases, the citations in patents might provide little information about 
the sources of knowledge (see discussions about the role of the examiner in Alcácer et al., 
2009; Azagra-Caro & Tur, 2018). Therefore, it seems reasonable to exclude the citations 
added by examiners. Several validation studies have clarified the limitations of this meas-
ure in capturing knowledge flows (e.g., Roach & Cohen, 2013; Jaffe & de Rassenfosse, 
2017; and Corsino et al., 2019). One of the main conclusions of these studies is that patent 
citations entail ‘noise’ as an indicator of knowledge flow, but they are simultaneously the 
most widely used measure of spillovers in the economics, management, and policy fields.
Assuming the above-mentioned limitations, the main independent variable in this analy-
sis is:
• Backward patent citations to the competitor (backcomp). Every patent filed by the focal 
company (recipient) that includes citations to patents held by its main rival (source) 
was considered an inter-organizational learning event in which the recipient learned and 
applied bits of knowledge from the competitor. As stated in our hypotheses, for technol-
ogies forming a duopoly between the two large firms, we expect a non-significant coef-
3 For recent reviews on patent citations, see Jaffe and de Rassenfosse (2017), and Sharma and Tripathi 
(2017).
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ficient for this variable. However, it should be positive and significant for other patented 
technologies produced by each company outside the duopoly.
The two other sources of knowledge from which the firm can capture ideas to build pat-
ents of better quality are:
• Other backward patent citations (backothers). As we divided patent citations into 
three types (from competitor, self-citations and others), it is necessary to account for 
these other patent citations that make up the total number of backward citations. These 
include citations to other companies, universities, and research centres, capturing the 
extent to which a patent relies on previous technological knowledge developed in pat-
ents owned by these agents. According to the recent review by Jaffe and de Rassenfosse 
(2017) the empirical literature is inconclusive; the authors provide several examples 
in which the extent to which backward citations correlate with patent importance is 
unclear.
• Self-citations (backself). Every citation made by the focal firm was considered an intra-
organizational learning event in which the firm applied bits of knowledge previously 
developed. These measure the extent to which the innovators benefit from their own 
innovations (Dindaroğlu, 2018). Self-citations are also a sign of competitive advantage 
in a specific technological field (Hall et al., 2005; Popp et al., 2013) and they are usu-
ally correlated with patent quality (Bessen, 2008; Popp et al., 2013).
3.2.2  Other determinant variables of patent quality
The type and number of patent quality determinants vary widely across studies. The inclu-
sion of the explanatory factors in models depends on the objective of each empirical study 
and the availability of data. In this respect, we control for seven determinants of patent 
quality that were common in previous studies:
• Scientific citations (npl). The antecedents of a patent include not only citations to other 
patents (backward citations), but also non-patent citations. Usually known as citation to 
non-patent literature, this variable encompasses scientific publications, other relevant 
scientific literature, and firm reports. The rationale for including scientific citations as 
a determinant of patent quality relies on capturing the complexity and science intensity 
of the current patent (Cassiman et al., 2008; Squicciarini et al., 2013; van Raan, 2017). 
The empirical literature draws mixed conclusions about the effect of npl on the num-
ber of forward patent citations. For example, the analysis at the patent level by Bran-
stetter (2005) suggests that the incidence of citation of academic science is positively 
associated with measures of invention quality; in this same paper, he also stresses that 
citations to academic science are highly concentrated in a small number of technolo-
gies. Sorenson and Fleming (2004) found that patents that reference published mate-
rial, whether peer-reviewed or not, receive more citations. In contrast, Gittelman and 
Kogut (2003) demonstrate for the biotechnology sector, which presents strong linkages 
between technological innovation and scientific knowledge, that important scientific 
papers are negatively associated with high-impact innovations. Cassiman et al. (2008) 
point out that scientific citations in patents do not significantly explain the forward 
citations of the patent, and that the linkage to science is more important at the firm 
level than at the patent level. In other papers, the significance of the coefficient depends 
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on the sector. Harhoff et al., (2003a, 2003b) found a positive effect in pharmaceutical 
and chemical patents, but not in other technical fields. van Zeebroeck, and van Pot-
telsberghe (2011) carried out a sensitivity analysis using a large sample of patents and 
several sectors and countries. They report a positive and significant effect of npl on 
forward citations in 11 out of 14 industries (two non-significant and one negative), and 
in 11 out of 17 countries (six non-significant and one negative).
• Originality (original). Patent originality refers to the breadth of the technology fields 
on which a patent relies (Squicciarini et al., 2013). In this paper, we use the original-
ity index proposed by Trajtenberg et  al. (1997), also detailed in Hall et  al. (2001): 
Originality = 1 −
∑ni
j
sij , where  sij is the share of citations made by patent i that belong 
to patent class j, out of  ni patent classes. The index ranges between 0 and 1, and cap-
tures whether the patent cites other patents from a wide range of technology classes, 
or from only a selected group. A large ‘originality’ value (close to 1) indicates broader 
technological roots of the underlying research (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). In other words, 
a higher originality index implies that the patent in question is more original since it is 
not just a continuation of one or a few previous patents. Although it can be expected 
that more original patents receive on average more citations, this is not always the 
case. For example, Popp (2006) found that the higher the originality index, the fewer 
the number of forward citations, whereas Benson and Magee (2015) did not find any 
effect.4
• Radicalness. (radical). There are several definitions and measures of radicalness (see 
the review by Dahlin & Behrens, 2005). We follow Shane (2001), Squicciarini et al. 
(2013), and Egli et al., (2015) in identifying radicalness as an indication of the extent 
to which a patent relies on previous inventions from fields other than its own. A radi-
cal patent develops something new in its field (Shane, 2001; Egli et al., 2015, p. 3). We 
adopted a simplified version of an index proposed by Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001) and 
Shane (2001), consisting of the number of different international patent classification 
(IPC) classes embedded in the cited patents that are different from those included in 
the focal patent. As in previous studies (Schoenmakersa and Duysters, 2010; Briggs 
& Buehler, 2018), radicalness was expected to be correlated with patents presenting a 
larger number of forward citations.
• Scope of the patent (scope). The scope of the patent captures its technological breadth. 
Apparently, the larger the number of technologies embedded in a patent, the greater 
the opportunities to be cited. However, patent scope can be the response to a strat-
egy designed to achieve the exclusion of competitors (Harhoff & Reitzig, 2004). This 
means that if the number of fields that a patent can cover is large, then the possibility 
of infringement rises, which may reduce the subsequent citations of the patent due to 
the risk of infringement. As in Lerner (1994) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004), 
we measured the scope using the number of distinct 4-digit IPC subclasses of a pat-
ent family. The effects of scope to explain patent quality are ambiguous in empirical 
analyses. Messeni Petruzzelli et  al. (2015) found that patents with a broader scope 
exert a stronger influence (measured by forward patent citations) on the technologi-
cal developments outside biotechnology. This result resembles other works that used 
different measures of patent quality. For example, Lerner (1994) showed that patents 
4 We have intentionally excluded the index of ‘generality’ from our independent variable list to avoid endo-
geneity. The definition is similar to the originality index, but using forward citations instead of backward 
citations (note that our dependent variable is the number of forward citations).
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assigned to more four-digit IPC classes are related to the firm’s value. However, in Har-
hoff and Reitzig (2004) the coefficient of scope is non-significant in explaining opposi-
tion to biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) 
found that the effect of the scope variable (number of different four-digit SIC codes) to 
explain litigation is negative (‘the narrower patents tend to be litigated more often’).
• Number of claims (claims). Claims are the list of ‘inventive things’ for which the appli-
cant is claiming exclusive rights. There are two main explanations for the positive cor-
relation between the number of claims and quality. First, the number and content of the 
claims determine the breadth of the rights conferred by a patent (Lanjouw & Schanker-
man, 2004). Thus, the number of claims can be considered an alternative to the number 
of CIP codes to capture the scope of the patent (Marco et  al., 2019; Novelli, 2015). 
There are however differences. Whereas the total number of claims corresponds to the 
number of variations in the core inventive ideas of the patent, the number of techno-
logical classes determines the position of the invention variations in the patent space 
(Novelli, 2015). The second reason to expect that patents with more claims are of better 
quality is the cost; the number of claims is one of the factors that determines the total 
cost of a patent (Zuniga et  al., 2009). The number of claims is frequently correlated 
with patent quality and value (Chang et al., 2018; Gambardella et al., 2008; Moaniba 
et al., 2018).
• Number of inventors (inventors). This is a rough variable that may increase both the 
cost of an invention and the richness of the knowledge involved in the patent, and the 
access to a wider and more heterogeneous external network (Guellec and van Pottels-
berghe, 2001; Singh, 2008; Lee et al., 2007; Sun et al., 2020). Some papers confirm that 
the number of inventors is positively associated with patent quality when the sample is 
composed mostly of corporate patents (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2001; Singh, 
2008), whereas the coefficient is found to be negative or not significant for academic 
patents (Sapsalis and van Pottelsberghe, 2007; Sterzi, 2013). As our analysis involves 
corporate patents, we expect a significant and positive sign for the coefficient of this 
variable.
• Family size (fsize). This variable accounts for the number of jurisdictions in which the 
inventor looks to protect a single invention. Applicants might be willing to accept the 
additional costs of and delays in extending protection to other countries only if it is 
worthwhile (Harhoff et al., 2003b; Squicciarini et al., 2013). If applying for protection 
in each country is costly, the family size should be directly related to the expected value 
of protecting an innovation (Lanjouw & Schankerman, 2004; de Rassenfosse and Jaffe, 
2017). Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) find that the patent family size is highly and 
positively correlated with patent quality. Other empirical papers confirm the relation-
ship between family size and patent value (Fischer & Leidinger, 2014; Harhoff et al., 
2003b).
3.2.3  Control variables
• The number of patents included in the family at the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office (USPTO) (uspto). We include this variable as control because of the localized pat-
tern of citations. In other words, forward citations are more likely to be domestic (e.g. 
Jaffe et al., 1993). This means that patents applied for at the USPTO have more chance 
of being cited by subsequent US applicants than by others. This would not be a problem 
if both EPO and USPTO offices had the same citations policy. However, US patent law 
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stipulates that failures to report known relevant prior art may lead to subsequent revocation 
of the patent (Cotropia et al., 2013; Jaffe & de Rassenfosse, 2017), which is an incentive to 
include more citations. This does not happen, for example, at the EPO, where applicants 
face no ‘duty of candour’ similar to that in the US, leading to a lower number of citations 
at the EPO (Alcácer et  al., 2009; Azagra-Caro & Tur, 2018; Azagra-Caro et  al., 2011; 
Criscuolo & Verspagen, 2008).
• Finally, the model also accounts for patent fields and time. The fields are captured by ten 
dummies, each taking the value of 1 if the family includes any of the three-digit codes of 
the aerospace industry, and 0 otherwise (the IPC codes are those defined by the OECD, 
2012, p. 82, as space-based technologies; see the bottom of Table 1). To avoid a truncation 
problem our dependent variable is the number of subsequent citations in a 5-year span. 
Moreover, we have included year dummies (from 1998 to 2014).
Table 1  Variables and definitions
Source: Patstat and own elaboration
a IPC codes: B64 Aircraft; Aviation; Cosmonautics; F41 Weapons; F42 Ammunition; Blasting; G01 Meas-
uring; Testing; G08 Signalling; HOI Basic electric elements; H02 Generation, conversion, or distribution of 
electric power; H03 Basic electronic circuitry; H04 Electric communication technique; H05 Electric tech-
niques not otherwise provided for
Variable Definition
Dependent variable
 fpc5years No. forward citations within five years after the first application 
of the focal patent family
Independent variables
 Variables capturing flows of knowledge
  backcomp No. backward citations to the main competitor (Hypotheses 1 
and 2)
  backothers No. backward citations to other agents
  backself No. backward self-citations (Hypothesis 3)
 Other determinants of patent quality
  npl No. citations to non-patent literature
  original Originality index (Hall et al., 2001; Trajtenberg et al., 1997)
  radical Radicality index (simplified version proposed by Shane, 2001)
  scope No. different 4-digit subclasses of the IPC (Lerner, 1994)
  claims No. claims in the focal patent family
  inventors No. different inventors of the focal patent family
  fsize No. patents in the focal patent family
 Control variables
  uspto No. US patents in the family that were applied for at the UPSTO
  IPC dummies 10 dummies (each takes value 1 if the family include a particular 
IPC code, 0 otherwise)a
  Year dummies 17 dummies (years 1998 to 2014)
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3.3  Model
To specify and estimate the model, both the count nature of the dependent variable, and 
the number of zeros that it might contain have to be considered. A Poisson specification 
is often the starting point for modelling a count variable following the non-linear form:
where ‘i’ is our unit of analysis (patent family). If the data display overdispersion, the 
standard error of the Poisson model will be biased toward the lower end, resulting in spuri-
ously high values of the t-statistic (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986). The most common formula-
tion for considering overdispersion is the negative binomial (NB) model, as it assumes that 
the variance is a quadratic function of the mean (for a comprehensive discussion of the 
estimation procedure, see Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). The proposal of the density func-
tion, the logarithmic likelihood function and the first-order conditions, etc., are discussed 
comprehensively in Cameron and Trivedi (1998). Alternatives when the sample contains 
many zeros are zero-inflated models (zero-inflated Poisson [ZIP], Lambert, 1992; and zero-
inflated negative binomial [ZINB], Heilbron, 1994). In these cases, the zero-inflated dis-
tribution can be interpreted as a finite mixture with a distribution whose mass is concen-
trated at zero. This model contains two sources of overdispersion, one that allows several 
extra zeros, and another that introduces the individual heterogeneity of the set with positive 
values. As there are no clear theoretical reasons to think of a mixture of distributions in 
our data, we have opted to estimate Poisson and NB models. We use zero-inflated mod-
els as a robustness check to analyse the sensitivity of the estimated coefficients in other 
specifications.
4  Data
4.1  Data and sources
Our hypotheses are tested by drawing on a sample of patents owned by the two large 
firms –Airbus and Boeing– that matches the setup of our assumptions. Airbus SE is a 
European public company based in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. It is listed in France, 
Germany and Spain. As there have been several integration and normalization steps in 
the last few years, following the latest Airbus report (2018), we refer only to Airbus, 
which includes the company along with its subsidiaries. Airbus has three divisions: 
Commercial Aircraft, Defence and Space, and Helicopters, the third being the largest in 
its industry in terms of revenues and turbine helicopter deliveries. The Boeing Company 
is an American multinational corporation. It has two large divisions: Boeing Commer-
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was acquired by Boeing, leaving only Boeing and Airbus to manufacture the largest 
commercial airplanes, resulting in one of the few global duopolies. As part of the aero-
space sector, the aircraft industry is highly concentrated at both the firm and country 
levels, where there is a duopoly for the major segments of the market. Both firms also 
produce a variety of technology products, mainly in other fields of the aerospace indus-
try, where there are many competitors.
Our data include information about patent families owned by Airbus and Boeing from 
1998 to 2014. We took 1998 as the first year of the sample because the duopoly in the 
aircraft industry started in this year. The sample ends in 2014 because of the decline in 
the number of patents afterwards.5 We obtained information on patent data using the EPO 
Worldwide Patent Statistical Database (PATSTAT). The search in PATSTAT was the name 
of the applicant. There were few problems with Boeing, as almost all its patents contain 
the harmonized name ‘Boeing Company’. However, Airbus has a substantial number of 
subsidiaries that applied for patents, and many of them do not have the name of the par-
ent company ‘Airbus’ in their name (e.g. MBDA, ArianeGroup, Premium Aerotec GmbH, 
Table 2  Distribution of Airbus and Boeing patents by IPC codes (1998–2014)
Source: Patstat and own elaboration. Dominant position includes the IPC codes where Airbus and Boeing 
account for the majority of the global patents. Non-dominant position includes other technologies to which 
the two focal firms contribute, but to a lesser extent
a Note that the sum of the patents in each class is not the total number of families (an invention can be clas-
sified in several patent classes)
IPC codes Description No. patent  familiesa % families per patent 
class
Airbus Boeing A&B World % A&B/world
Dominant position
B64C1 Fuselages; constructional 
features, etc.
1012 499 1511 2579 58.6
B64C3 Wings 387 237 624 1012 61.7
B64C9 Adjustable control surfaces or 
members
226 96 322 500 64.4
Non-dominant position
Rest of B64 Aircraft; Aviation; Cosmo-
nautics
1473 693 2166 10,533 20.6
G01 Measuring, testing 728 769 1497 148,184 1.0
H04 Electric communication 
technique
288 464 752 234,747 0.3
H01 Basic electric elements 275 373 648 170,628 0.4
G08 Signalling 212 240 452 23,399 1.9
H02;H03;H05 Electric power; Basic elec-
tronic circuit…
329 366 695 136,247 0.5
F41; F42 Weapons; Ammunition, 
blasting
55 57 112 5452 2.1
5 The process of granting a patent can take several years (Zuniga et al., 2009, p. 72), and the latest years 
with available information in PATSTAT clearly show this decline.
 M. Acosta et al.
1 3
Stelia Aerospace, ATR GIE). Thus, the first step was to gather all the names and follow 
their transformation since the beginning of the sample. The subsidiaries’ names were 
mainly taken from Airbus annual reports.
To ensure that the patent has a certain quality standard, we retrieved the most important 
and valuable inventions for both companies, following the criterion of patents applied for at 
least at USPTO and EPO. In this period, Airbus and Boeing owned 4386 and 3364 patent 
families, respectively (patent information shows that there is not any joint patent applied 
for by both companies). Following the OECD (2012), patents were classified in technologi-
cal fields (patent classes) in two differentiated technological markets. The first consists of 
family patents that include IPC codes where the two companies have a dominant position 
in the production of technology. These IPC classes are B64C1, B64C3 and B64C9 (special 
technologies related to the aircraft technologies), where they account for 58.6%, 61.7% and 
64.4% of the world patent families, respectively (Table  2). The second group considers 
other technologies in which the global number of family patents is shared with many other 
companies. In this group, Airbus and Boeing do not have a dominant position, and they 
own up to 20.6% of global patents in technologies of the B64 class (excluding B64C1, 
B64C3 and B64C9). This share is considerably less in other classes such as signalling and 
weapons, where they make up around 2% (Table 2).
To account for time, family patents were sorted by the priority year (when the first appli-
cation for the family was filed). Finally, we tracked the forward and the backward-cited 
patents (excluding citations made by examiners), which allowed us to identify knowledge 
inflows from the main competitor (citations to the competitor), from other external sources, 
and the internal knowledge from the company itself (self-citations). Figure  1 includes a 
patent from our sample classified into several B64 subclasses (aircraft, aviation). The left 
part of the figure shows all backward citations, which are divided into three parts depend-
ing on the source of knowledge. According to the hypotheses put forward in the previous 
section, our main analysis focuses on whether citations to competitors (in the left part of 
the figure) affect the number of citations of this patent in subsequent patents (right part of 
the figure).
Assignee: The Boeing Company
Patent family: US 7,325,771 B2; EP 1 794 050 B1;…
Inventors: J. F. Stulc; W. C. Chan; Brian C. C.; N. G. Rolfes
Priority to US10/949,848; Date: 2004-09-23
Classifications:
B64C1/069 Joining arrangements therefor
B64C1/068 Fuselage sections















































Fig. 1  Knowledge flows and technological quality of patents: an example of backward and forward patent 
citations (FPC). Source: PATSTAT and own elaboration
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4.2  The long‑term technological relationship between Airbus and Boeing
Figure 2 presents the evolution in the number of patents owned by Airbus and Boeing from 
1991 to 2014. This figure shows that during the first years, Boeing exhibited a larger num-
ber of inventions than Airbus. After the start of the duopoly, both companies increased 
their patenting output. Nevertheless, since 1998, the data show an improvement in Airbus’s 
patenting activity: this firm remained leader in the number of patent families per year until 
2011. In the following years, Boeing intensified its innovation activity, thus surpassing Air-
bus (the rest of the analysis focuses on the years after the duopoly, the period 1998–2014).
Table  2 provides more insights into the subclass distribution within the B64 class in 
which the duopoly holds. The data show that Airbus leads Boeing in the share of patents 
in all subclasses within B64C, ranging from 58.6% in ‘Fuselages’ to 64.4% in ‘Adjustable 
control surfaces’. With respect to technologies in which Airbus and Boeing do not domi-
nate, Airbus holds a much larger share of patents in ‘Aircraft, aviation and cosmonautics’ 
(68% vs 32%). However, Boeing outperforms Airbus in patenting activity in other sectors, 
with particular superiority in H04 ‘Electronic communication technique’ (61.7% patent 
families of Boeing vs 38.3% of Airbus) and H01 ‘Basic electric elements’ sector (57.6% 
patents families by Boeing vs 42.4% of Airbus).
Table 3 presents the data on forward citations for both companies (indicator of qual-
ity). On average, patents owned by Boeing received a higher number of citations per pat-
ent family than Airbus (1.8 vs 1.0). The upper part of this Table provides a more detailed 
analysis of forward citations of the subclasses within the sector B64, in which both com-
panies enjoy a dominant position in the production of patented technology. In all these 
subclasses we observe a higher average of forward citations of Boeing’s patents compared 
to Airbus’s patents, suggesting Boeing’s patents are of a higher quality. Differences remain 
across other IPC codes, particularly in ‘Measuring. Testing’ (2.2 average citations per pat-
ent for Boeing vs. 0.9 for Airbus) and ‘Signalling’ (2.7 average citations per patent for 
Boeing vs. 1.1 for Airbus).
Table 4 lists the backward citations of both companies divided into backward citations 
to the competitor, self-citations and backward citations to others. Three main observations 
can be drawn from the descriptive data of backward citations. First, the number of cita-
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Fig. 2  Number of Airbus and Boeing patent families (1991–2014). Source: Patstat and own elaboration
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backward citations (3% in Airbus’s patents and 1.6% in Boeing’s patents). Second, the rela-
tive percentage of citations to the competitor (with respect to the total number of backward 
citations) is larger in the technologies that make up the duopoly compared with other tech-
nologies. Third, Airbus cites more patents of Boeing than Boeing of Airbus (both in abso-
lute and relative terms). This is surprising because the absolute number of Boeing citations 
is 54% more than those included in Airbus’s patents. Columns (3) and (4) show the number 
of self-citations of each company and citations to other institutions (for all technologies, 
around 9% of all backward citations are self-citations, whereas the greatest part are cita-
tions to other agents).
5  Results
5.1  Main estimation results
Our dependent variable (patent quality) is the number of forward citations received by each 
patent family in the five years following the publication of the first application. Table  5 
presents the descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the dependent and all the 
explanatory variables. The number of forward citations in each patent ranges between 0 
and 42. The average number of forward citations is 1.38, with a standard deviation of 2.53. 
This is rough evidence of overdispersion that would favour the NB specifications rather 
than Poisson models.
We estimated Poisson and NB models with all the independent variables described in 
Sect. 3.2 (summarized in Table 1). The models also account for the office where the patent 
family was first applied for, technological classes and year dummies. To control for the dif-
ference in forward citations between the two companies, we included the dummy variable 
boeing, which takes value 1 if the patent was applied for by Boeing, and 0 if the patent was 
applied for by Airbus. To select the best models between Poisson and NB, a likelihood 
ratio (LR) test of the overdispersion parameter α was performed (see LR chi2 in Table 6). 
The null hypothesis α = 0 is rejected, providing evidence that the NB models are preferred 
over Poisson. Thus, we focus on the NB models displayed in Table 6. Models 1 and 2 were 
estimated with samples in which Airbus and Boeing held a dominant position in the pro-
duction of technology (those including three patent subclasses in the fields of aircraft and 
aviation, in which the two companies account for most of the global patents). Models 3 and 
4 show the estimations for patented technologies developed by the two companies in fields 
where there is no such dominance. Models 1 and 3 in Table 6 are the main models to test 
our two hypotheses. Models 2 and 4 (with interaction terms) in the same Table are used to 
further analyse different behaviour between the two focal companies.
The first hypothesis stated that in a global duopoly where the focal firms are in a domi-
nant position in technology production, external knowledge embodied in patents released 
by one of the firms (source), and captured by the other (recipient), does not affect the qual-
ity of the recipient’s patented technologies. The key variable to test this hypothesis is back-
comp (no. of citations to the competitor). The coefficient of this variable is non-significant 
in the NB Model 1, providing support to Hypothesis 1. This result suggests that, in a global 
duopoly, capturing bits of knowledge from the competitor (source) through patent citations 
would not affect the quality of the technology patented by the recipient.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that, while the firms in the global duopoly with dominant posi-
tion in the production of specific technologies take considerable precautions in releasing 
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useful knowledge, they would not be so cautious when such dominance does not exist. 
In other words, there are other companies producing similar technologies, and the tech-
nological proximity between the two large companies is not as narrow as in the first 
case. As explained in Sect. 2.2, the reason for not avoiding the leakage of technologi-
cal knowledge is simply that the benefits that the firms might obtain by diffusing rel-
evant information to their many competitors may outweigh for the drawbacks. Model 3 
shows the estimation results for the factors affecting patent quality in such a situation of 
non-dominance by the focal firms. Again, the variable backcomp is essential to testing 
this hypothesis. This variable presents a highly significant coefficient, suggesting that 
the citation to the main competitor affects the quality of the competitor’s patents. The 
average marginal effect over backcomp shows that an extra citation to the competitor is 
associated, on average, with a 0.17 increase in the number of forward citations, setting 
the other variables at their means. Furthermore, the marginal effect increases according 
to the number of backward citations to the competitor, ranging from an increase of 0.1 
extra forward citation for those patents with just one citation to the competitor to 0.20 
forward citations for those with 7 and more citations to the competitor.
Models 2 and 4 are helpful in adding a further discussion about the differences 
between the two focal companies. In these models we have introduced interaction terms 
between the regressors and the dummy boeing. In total, the models rely on a set of 48 
explanatory variables. Note that we include the three variables in which we broke up 
backward citations (to competitors, to others, and self-citations), seven traditional deter-
minants on patent quality, the dummy boeing and 12 interaction terms to capture the 
difference between Boeing and Airbus, and 25 control variables (one dummy to control 
the US Patent Office, 10 to account for the IPC classes and 14-year dummies).
Given the large number of explanatory variables, one main concern about the reli-
ability of our results arises from the variables that may be correlated between them 
and—in particular—with our target variable backcomp (citations to the main competi-
tor). However, this variable presents acceptable variation inflation factor (VIF) statistics 
of 3.05 and 3.24 for the interaction between backcomp and the dummy boeing (values 
exceeding 5 or 10 are frequently used as indication of problematic multicollinearity). 
Thus, the VIF of our key variable suggests that multicollinearity is not a concern for 
the stability of its estimated coefficient. Other regressors (in particular year dummies) 
present higher VIF values, but this is not an issue since the high VIFs of other variables 
do not affect the variance of our target variable (see discussion in Allison, 1999). To 
further identify the consequences of multicollinearity on the main (and other) variables, 
Models 2 and 4 with the interaction terms can be compared with Models 1 and 3 with-
out interactions. Note that there are no changes in the signs and significance of the main 
determinants of patent quality with the only exception the coefficient of the variable 
radical, which maintains a positive sign, but turns significant in Model 4 with respect to 
Model 3 (without interactions).
The interaction term between Boeing and citation to the competitor 
(boeing*backcomp) is not significant in Model 2, supporting the result obtained in 
Model 1 about Hypothesis 1. However, the significant coefficient of the interaction term 
boeing*backcomp in Model 4 shows that there is a clear difference in the effects of com-
petitor’s citations between Airbus and Boeing. As the effect on Boeing is given by the 
sum of backcomp and boeing*backcomp, a linear restriction test needs to be performed 
to identify whether ‘the sum of both coefficients equal zero’ is statistically significant. 
The result shows that this hypothesis was not rejected (χ2 = 0.02, p = 0.88); in other 
words, the effect of the competitor’s citations is not relevant in explaining Boeing’s 
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patent quality. This mixed result between a significant effect for Airbus, and no effect in 
the case of Boeing, suggests that only one of the two large firms (Airbus) harnesses the 
competitor’s ideas.
5.2  Robustness check
The previous results are based on the estimation of NB models. In this section, we examine 
how robust the results are to other specifications. Since the number of zeros in the sample 
was 49.5% (dominant position in the production of technology) and 53.7% (non-dominant 
position), we estimated zero-inflated Poisson models (ZIP), and zero inflated negative 
binomial models (ZINB). Table 7 presents the results of ZINB models (according to the 
Likelihood-ratio tests of alpha = 0, these models are preferred to the ZIP; see LR chi2 in 
Table 7).
Testing our hypothesis from the results of the ZINB models led to the same conclusions 
as those obtained from the main models shown in Table 6. In regressions estimated with 
the dominant-position sample, the variable backcomp (no. of citations to the competitor) is 
non-significant in Models 5 and 6 (this later model includes the set of interactions, where 
the interaction between backcomp and boeing is not significant either). These results cor-
roborate the findings of our main models. As for the sample including other technologies 
in which Airbus and Boeing do not dominate, Table 7 (Models 7 and 8) shows the same 
results as our main NB models. In other words, only one of the firms takes advantage of the 
main competitor’s patents.
Further robustness checks were performed by using other versions of the dependent var-
iable. Following the main literature, we have taken a 5-year window (counting the forward 
citations 5 years after the first publication of the focal patent) as dependent variable in the 
above estimated models. However, some authors have established a shorter span of three 
years (e.g., Briggs, 2015; Briggs & Wade, 2014). To analyse whether our hypotheses hold 
compared to the main models, we have run the NB regressions using the number of cita-
tions at three years after the first publication of the patent. The results show some changes 
in the coefficients, but not in the significance of our main variables.6
6  Discussion
Our models provide evidence in favour of Hypothesis 1, that in a global duopoly where 
two large firms make up the majority of all global patents, there are no leaks of crucial 
knowledge from which the competitor may benefit to improve their patents. With respect to 
Hypothesis 2, our results also support the prediction that when the focal firms do not have 
a dominant position in technology production, spillovers arising from disclosing informa-
tion in patents owned by one of the two firms positively affect the patent quality of the 
other. Regarding this later scenario, additional analysis reveals that only one of the two 
firms benefits from the main competitor’s knowledge when the production of technology is 
shared by many firms. These outcomes were robust to several specifications and other ways 
of counting the number of forward citations (using a 3-year instead of a 5-year window).
6 To avoid an excessive list of tables that might result in confusion, we do not present these models, but 
they are all available upon request.
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From a management viewpoint, our results are useful for firms concerned by leakages 
of knowledge through patent disclosure to a rival. In the first setting of the global duopoly 
(dominance of the focal firms in the production of technology) our findings indicate that 
the two firms fully appropriate all their R&D investment. In other words, the knowledge 
leakages in a situation of duopolistic competition with a dominant position in production 
of technology are intentional and without value for the rival. Each firm purposely discloses 
some knowledge in their patents that can support the background of the main competitor’s 
patents, but without any effect in terms of increasing the quality of the latter’s patents. This 
symmetric result suggests that both firms behave in a similar manner, preventing the other 
from obtaining a free ride on ideas embedded in the main competitor’s patents.
The finding of our first hypothesis connects with the theoretical literature triggered by 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) showing that R&D investment and welfare are higher 
under R&D cooperation than under R&D competition if the spillovers are above a certain 
threshold, and lower otherwise (see also subsequent papers such as Suetens, 2005, and Cel-
lini & Lambertini, 2009). If we rely on these models, the confirmation of the first hypoth-
esis suggests that the opportunities for collaboration between the two firms in a global 
duopoly—e.g. Airbus and Boeing—are low, and the spillovers are extremely small (use-
less for the competitor wishing to produce quality patents). The full appropriability has a 
negative consequence for the whole industry as the lack of cooperation, and the low level 
of spillovers, lead to some duplication and prevent both from using competitor spillovers 
that would contribute to improving patent quality. This discussion suggests that despite 
spillovers being low, any form of collaboration should be encouraged through the initiative 
of the companies, and should also be spurred by governments. First, companies could save 
on R&D, and second, with the active encouragement of the government, benefits in terms 
of increasing patent quality in the whole industry could be achieved. In this respect, several 
papers have shown that collaborative patents would not only bring advantages to the sector, 
but could have a significant impact on subsequent technologies and firm value (Belderbos 
et al., 2014; Briggs & Wade, 2014; Singh, 2008; Singh & Fleming, 2010). Thus, a direct 
implication of the confirmation of our first hypothesis is that a movement towards a more 
proactive means of cooperation between the two large companies should be encouraged 
in order to strengthen the patent quality of both firms, with positive consequences for the 
whole sector. This does not mean evolving towards a greater concentration of the mar-
ket, but rather working together to create new inventions in which there are common inter-
ests, particularly in technological fields with widespread social returns (environmentally 
friendly technologies would be a clear example).
Finally, the control by the two companies over the information that flows out into the 
pool of publicly available disclosed information in patents also has implications for the 
patent system. In particular, the difficulty in harnessing disclosed technological knowledge 
in patents from each competitor in a global duopoly casts some doubt on one of the main 
objectives of the patent system, which is facilitating follow on inventions and avoiding 
duplication of R&D efforts. This difficulty suggests that more emphasis should be put on 
the patent examination procedure when a patent is applied for by firms in global duopolies.
In the second scenario represented by Hypothesis 2, the strain between the two compa-
nies is reduced, and their contribution in the production of patent is less significant. Our 
main empirical results show that in this case of a non-dominant position of the focal firms 
in the production of technology, spillovers from the competitors affect patent quality. How-
ever, additional analysis suggests that only one of the two firms—Airbus—benefits from 
the rival’s knowledge to improve patent quality. Our intuition is that in fields where the two 
firms have a moderate level of participation in the generation of patents, the fact that only 
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one company takes advantage of the competitor’s knowledge has to do with the size of the 
patented inventions. Using the number of claims as a rough indicator of patent size, we 
observe that Boeing presents 17.3 claims on average, with a maximum of 132, compared 
to 12.0, and a maximum of 65 for Airbus. Theoretical models support this idea of scarce 
spillovers from smaller patents. For example, according to the seminal model by Anton and 
Yao (2004), inventions of smaller size are less prone to spillovers than larger ones. Never-
theless, the fact that spurring patent quality from spillovers embedded in large inventions 
could be more effective than from small inventions requires further analysis that is worth 
exploring (and is left for future research).
As for the other variables that we use as determinants of patent quality, there are no 
surprising results with respect to previous literature. We discuss our main findings in the 
following paragraphs.
Backward self-citations (backself) affect the quality of patented technology because of 
the accumulation of knowledge along the inventive path. This holds independently of the 
level of competition in the technology market. The main regressions (Models 1 and 3) pre-
sent a positive and highly significant coefficient for this variable, providing strong support 
for the idea that the more intensive the use of internal knowledge embodied in previous 
patents captured by backward self-citations, the higher the quality of the patent. Further 
analysis presented in models with the interaction terms (Models 2 and 4) that identify a 
possible difference in behaviour for each company, shows a negative significant coefficient 
of the interaction term boeing*backself in Model 4. As the effect on Boeing is given by the 
sum of the coefficients of backself and boeing*backself, a linear restriction test needs to 
be performed to identify whether ‘the sum of both coefficients equals zero’ is statistically 
significant. The result shows a Chi-squared = 11.79 (p = 0.0006). Thus, the effect of self-
citation on patent quality is greater in Airbus (0.196) than in Boeing (0.196–0.136), but 
positive and significant in both cases. Results of a similar nature concerning the effects of 
self-citations on patent quality were found by Bessen (2008) and Popp et al. (2013).
The coefficient of the variable patent citations to other agents (backothers) is not sig-
nificant in any model. Previous studies do not clarify this lack of significance. As indicated 
above, the review by Jaffe and de Rassenfosse (2017) includes references with mixed find-
ings that do not shed light on the extent to which backward citations correlate with patent 
quality. Backward citations gather patents from a variety of entities. Thus, our intuition is 
that breaking down this variable according to the type of source of the backward citation 
may provide a clearer picture of what type of knowledge source (if any) has a positive 
impact on patent quality.
The variable capturing non-patent literature (npl) is not significant in our main models. 
As pointed out by Branstetter (2005) citations to science concentrate on few technological 
fields. A positive significance seems to be related to fields with strong reliance on science 
such as pharmaceuticals, chemistry and biotechnology (Arts et  al., 2013; Harhoff et  al., 
2003b). Thus, the lack of significance of the coefficient of npl in our models is not surpris-
ing in a sector such as aircraft, which is more grounded in technology than in science.
The index of originality (original), is not relevant in any model, suggesting, as in Ben-
son and Magee (2015), that those patents with broader knowledge incorporated through 
backward citations are not necessarily the most cited. The scope variable points in the same 
direction with a non-significant effect, implying that the number of technologies in patents 
(measured by the number of IPC codes) is not correlated with the number of forward tech-
nologies in the aircraft sector. A similar finding was obtained by Messeni Petruzzelli et al. 
(2015). The variable claims is relevant in almost all models, indicating—as in other papers 
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(Chang et al., 2018; Gambardella et al., 2008; Moaniba et al., 2018)—a significant rela-
tionship between the number of claims and quality.
We did not find strong evidence for the effect of an invention radicalness (radical) on 
patent quality. Only in one of the models estimated with patent classes in which there is not 
dominance in the production of technology was this variable relevant (and just for one of 
the focal firms). To our knowledge, only two related studies have identified a relationship 
between radicalness (with indexes based on patent information) and quality (measured by 
forward citations), but in a rather different context to that studied in this paper. The first by 
Schoenmakers and Duysters (2010) found a significant difference between the number of 
technology classifications embodied in backward citations between patents that received 
less than 20 forward citations in a five-year time period, and those that received more than 
that figure. This paper points to the fact that patents with a stronger reliance on recombina-
tion of previous knowledge (as an indicator of radicalness) have an greater probability of 
being cited. The second by Briggs and Buehler (2018) use a large sample of more than five 
million patents and citations from 1976 to 2017. Estimating several specifications, their 
findings show that radicalness affects forward citations in an inverted-U shape.
The number of inventors (inventors) is statistically significant in all models. This find-
ing points to the fact that an increase in the number of inventors significantly affects patent 
quality, in line with other studies on corporate patents such as Sapsalis et al. (2006), Guel-
lec and van Pottelsberghe (2000, 2002), and Singh (2008). These empirical papers suggest 
that larger teams are associated with strategic research projects with high expected profits, 
and consequently higher quality. Finally, empirical papers confirm the relationship between 
family size and patent value (as in, for example, Fischer & Leidinger, 2014; Harhoff et al., 
2003b). However, in our models the size of the patent family (fsize) is relevant only in tech-
nologies with dominant position of the focal firms. A plausible explanation is that a larger 
number of patents in a family relates to quality, but only in technological fields that need 
more protection because leakages of knowledge can be more damaging for the applicant 
than in other fields with less competitive strain.
7  Conclusions
Spillovers occur through a variety of channels such as publications, patents, technical 
meetings, conversations with employees of innovating firms, hiring of employees by inno-
vative firms, and reverse engineering. This paper contributes to the literature on spillo-
vers and patent quality by investigating whether disclosed patent information affects patent 
quality in the context of a global duopoly. To capture spillovers from the main competitor 
we divided the sources of inflows of knowledge used to produce quality patents into three 
parts: knowledge from the main competitor, the firm’s own knowledge, and other sources 
of knowledge. Two main hypotheses were posed. Both related to the role of the external 
knowledge from the competitor on patent quality in two different scenarios. The first con-
sidered a situation in which the two firms dominate the production of patents in specific 
technological fields. The second examined a scenario with a larger number of firms pro-
ducing patents, and with considerably lower participation of the two focal firms that form 
a duopoly (where they do not account for the majority of patents). Our empirical analysis 
focused on the case of Airbus and Boeing; two large firms that compete in a global duop-
oly. The two firms—Airbus and Boeing—compete with each other in producing specific 
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patented technologies with a clear dominance in some specific technologies within the air-
craft industry. At the same time, they are also involved in producing patents in other fields 
with more competitors where they do not hold a dominant position. The analysis, built on 
a sample of 7750 patent families and the estimation of several count models, leads to the 
conclusions presented in the following paragraphs.
First, the results provide evidence supporting Hypothesis 1. This hypothesis states that 
the knowledge that each firm captures through patent citations from the main competitor 
does not affect their patent quality in a global duopoly where the two firms globally domi-
nate the production of patented technology. This finding suggests that the knowledge that 
one of the firms in the duopoly releases to the competitor when it discloses information in 
patents is irrelevant in producing patents of better quality. In other words, both firms dis-
close some knowledge in their patents, but this knowledge is without value to the competi-
tor for increasing patent quality.
Second, when two focal firms do not have a dominant position in producing patented tech-
nologies, citations to the main competitor affect patent quality, which supports Hypothesis 
2. However, in this latter scenario, further analysis suggests an asymmetric result: one of the 
firms—Airbus—benefits from the competitor’s patents, whereas the other—Boeing—does 
not harness the competitor’s knowledge to increase patent quality.
Our findings provide some directions for further empirical research that could widen 
our knowledge of the effects of spillovers from patent disclosure on patent quality. The 
first area of interest is whether the use of deliberately blurred written language in patents 
hampers the efficient use of incoming spillovers to produce patents of better quality. Sev-
eral strands of literature have developed the notion that firms attempt to manage incoming 
information flows both by increasing their absorptive capacity and by engaging in some 
form of cooperation. In our context, however, given that the two firms do not cooperate in 
producing patents, and that both firms are leaders in the industry with enough absorptive 
capacity (both invest heavily in R&D), our intuition is that the language in patents is suf-
ficiently confusing to deliberately prevent leakages of knowledge without infringement.
The second area of research involves examining whether incoming spillovers from large 
patented inventions are more conducive to patent quality than spillovers stemming from 
small inventions. This analysis requires reliable indicators that go beyond simple approxi-
mations of patent size such as the number of claims and patents in a family. The theoretical 
model by Anton and Yao (2004) (see also a discussion in Hall et al., 2014), suggests that 
for small patented innovations which are fully disclosed, no imitation occurs. It may be 
relevant to identify what size of patents are more conducive to spillovers that enhance pat-
ent quality. This could help both companies and the whole patent system. Companies could 
benefit from identifying what types of inventions are less damaging in terms of leakages of 
knowledge. The patent system could identify if there are failures in the system in terms of 
its objective of facilitating follow-on innovations through patent disclosure according to the 
size of the patented inventions.
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